Operation Entebbe, 1976

Phase One: The Hijacking and Uganda’s Welcome (27–28 June 1976)

Air France Flight 139 left Ben Gurion Airport on 27 June 1976, bound for Paris. The National Library of Israel records 248 passengers and 12 crew on board. Four hijackers boarded during the stop in Athens. Two were Germans from the Revolutionary Cells, and two belonged to the External Operations wing of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP-EO). [1] The German pair were Wilfried Böse and Brigitte Kuhlmann. The hijackers diverted the aircraft to Benghazi, Libya, refuelled, and flew on to Uganda’s main airport at Entebbe. [1] Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin learned of the hijacking during a cabinet meeting. He said he would hold France responsible for the Israelis on board. [2]

Israel set out its account of events at Entebbe before the UN Security Council on 9 July. Ambassador Chaim Herzog said that President Idi Amin came to the airport shortly before the aircraft landed on 28 June. Amin embraced the hijackers and promised them support. More armed men were waiting at the terminal. [3] Herzog also said that Ugandan soldiers gave the hijackers sub-machine guns and guarded the hostages alongside them. [3] The hijack team grew to seven. [1]

Uganda denied any collusion. Its foreign minister, Juma Oris Abdalla, told the Council that Amin let the aircraft land for humanitarian reasons, because it was circling with only 15 minutes of fuel left. He said Uganda had never condoned air piracy. [4]

Israel and Uganda gave the same account of the hijackers’ demand. The hijackers wanted 53 prisoners released from jails in Israel, West Germany, France, Switzerland and Kenya. [3][4] Rabin later told the cabinet that 40 of these prisoners were held in Israel. [2]

Phase Two: The Separation of the Hostages (29 June–1 July 1976)

The hijackers released 47 passengers, mostly women and children, on 30 June. They released 100 more on 1 July. [3] The people who remained were Israelis and some Jews of other nationalities. The National Library of Israel counts 105 Jewish and Israeli passengers who were moved to a separate part of the terminal. The hijackers offered to free the Air France captain, Michel Bacos, and his crew. The crew chose to stay with the hostages. [1]

Israel saw the separation in the light of Jewish history. Herzog told the Security Council that released passengers had described in Paris how Ugandan soldiers, acting on Amin’s orders, supervised the separation of Jewish from non-Jewish passengers. [3] Herzog compared this to the selections in Nazi concentration camps. He said it convinced the Israeli government that a rescue operation was the only remaining choice. [3]

Two of the hijackers were German, and the separation took place 31 years after the Holocaust ended. One hostage, Yitzhak David, was an Auschwitz survivor. He showed Böse the number tattooed on his arm and told him he had believed in a new Germany. Böse replied that he was not a Nazi and was only helping the Palestinians. [6] Survivors also recalled that Kuhlmann shouted antisemitic insults at the hostages. [6]

Accounts differ on how the hostages were sorted. Ilan Hartuv, a hostage who served as a translator, later said the hijackers separated Israelis from non-Israelis. He said many of the people released were Jewish. Hartuv also said the hijackers told him they were against Israel, not against Jews. [7] Hartuv recalled that two couples from Belgium and the United States and two teenagers from Brazil were nonetheless moved into the Israeli group. [7]

Phase Three: The Cabinet Debate, Negotiate or Strike (27 June–3 July 1976)

Israel’s policy was not to negotiate with hijackers. In June 2026 the Israel State Archives released its records of the crisis. These records show that the first military options were limited. Chief of Staff Mordechai Gur warned that the army could only mount an operation to kill the hijackers, not a rescue, because it lacked intelligence and the means to deploy forces. [2] Defence Minister Shimon Peres wrote to Rabin that any operation would need about two days to prepare. [2] Rabin doubted the idea at first. He told colleagues that the goal was to save people, not to carry out a military act, and that he saw no way forward at that moment. [2]

The hostages’ families pressed the government to negotiate. On 1 July, as the first deadline approached, the government announced for the first time that it was willing to negotiate. The talks ran through France almost until the raid began. [2] Rabin told the Knesset on 4 July that the cabinet had decided unanimously to release prisoners held in Israel if needed. He said this was a real decision and not a tactic to gain time. [3] The archives show that delay was also part of the reasoning. The State Archives summary says Israel needed to push back the hijackers’ deadline as far as possible. [2] The deadline was moved from 1 July to 4 July. [4]

On 2 July, Gur told a small group of ministers that a rescue plan now existed, although some intelligence was still missing. On 3 July he presented the full plan and judged that its chances of success were high. [2]

The cabinet met that afternoon in Tel Aviv. Peres described the dilemma as a choice between two duties: the security of the whole state and the security of each individual. Rabin set out the cost of a prisoner exchange, which was the release of 40 prisoners. He proposed approving the operation while warning that some hostages might be harmed. The cabinet approved the operation unanimously. [2]

Phase Four: Planning and the Raid (2–4 July 1976)

Gur’s plan used four Hercules transport aircraft carrying about 200 fighters and staff. The force would land at Entebbe, storm the terminal, load the hostages onto the aircraft and fly them home. [2] The National Library of Israel puts the ground force at 176 soldiers and commanders from Sayeret Matkal, the Paratroopers Brigade and the Golani Brigade. It gives the distance as more than 2,300 miles, or about 3,700 kilometres. [1] Some of the intelligence came from released hostages. Gur told the cabinet that this information showed why action was essential. [2]

Deception was built into the plan. The assault team drove off the aircraft in a Mercedes-Benz identical to one owned by Amin. [1] Air Force commander Benny Peled told the cabinet the aircraft would leave from Sharm el-Sheikh and fly along the Ethiopian coast. The aircraft took off at 3:30 p.m. on 3 July, before the cabinet’s formal vote. [2]

Kenya played a key part. Bruce McKenzie, a former Kenyan minister with close ties to Israeli intelligence, persuaded President Jomo Kenyatta to let Mossad personnel operate from Kenya. He also secured permission for Israeli aircraft to land in Nairobi to refuel and treat the wounded. In addition, he helped a Mossad agent fly over Entebbe to take aerial photographs. [10] Rabin told the cabinet that Israel would have to stand by Kenya if Uganda retaliated. [2] In public, Kenya told the Security Council that it had no prior knowledge of the raid. It said it allowed the Israeli aircraft to land in Nairobi only afterwards, on humanitarian grounds. [5]

The four aircraft landed in darkness shortly after midnight on 3-4 July. [2] Ugandan soldiers opened fire on the approaching force. Yonatan Netanyahu was shot, and the soldiers took the building on foot. [1] Rabin later told the cabinet that the force under Yonatan had run toward the terminal, that fire came from the second floor, and that one bullet struck him in the heart. [2]

All seven hijackers were killed. In its published account, accessed on 2 November 2026, the National Library of Israel gives the Ugandan dead as approximately 20 soldiers. [1] Five Israeli soldiers and six hostages were wounded. [2] Three hostages died: Ida Borochovitch, 56, and Jean-Jacques Maimoni, 19, at the terminal, and Pasco Cohen later, in a Nairobi hospital. [9] Captain Bacos later said that a hijacker shot Borochovitch. He said Israeli troops shot Maimoni and Cohen after mistaking them for hijackers. [8]

Phase Five: The Murder of Dora Bloch and the Diplomatic Aftermath (4 July 1976–24 May 1978)

Dora Bloch had fallen ill during the week and was taken to a hospital in Kampala. She was therefore not at the airport during the raid. Israel sent urgent messages to its embassies in London, Geneva and New York to secure her release. [2] She held both British and Israeli citizenship. Herzog told the Security Council that she was 75 and had been travelling to her son’s wedding. [3]

On 12 July, British minister Edward Rowlands addressed the House of Commons. He said a member of the British High Commission had seen Bloch in hospital after the raid was over. He said she had been taken from her room at Mulago Hospital at about 9:30 p.m. on 4 July and that she was almost certainly dead. [11] Rowlands added that Uganda still denied knowing where she was and said Israel was responsible for her. [11] The National Library of Israel states that she was murdered on Amin’s orders. [1] In August 1977, Henry Kyemba, who had been Uganda’s health minister at the time of the raid, said he was ready to testify that Amin had ordered her death. [12]

The diplomatic dispute moved to New York. The Security Council held five meetings between 9 and 14 July. They followed a complaint by the chairman of the Organization of African Unity, who called the raid an act of aggression against Uganda. [13] Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim said the landing appeared to be a serious violation of a member state’s sovereignty. [3]

Herzog argued that international law allows a state to use force to protect its citizens when the host state is unable or unwilling to protect them. [3] He told the Council that Israel was proud to have saved the lives of more than 100 people. [3] A draft resolution, S/12138, received six votes in favour on 14 July and was not adopted. The Council passed no resolution on the matter. [13]

Kenya paid a price for its help. On 24 May 1978, Bruce McKenzie was killed when a bomb exploded on his aircraft after a meeting with Amin. Ynet reports that the bomb was planted on Amin’s orders as revenge for McKenzie’s role in the rescue. [10]

Phase Six: Legacy in Doctrine, Film and Memory (1976–2026)

Rabin told the Knesset on 4 July that the rescue was Israel’s contribution to the struggle against international terror. He added that the struggle would require new efforts and new methods. [3] He told the cabinet that day: “We finished one battle, but the war continues.” [2]

Historians have traced the raid’s effect on other governments. Michael Stagnone of Boston College argues that Entebbe was a turning point in counter-terrorism. In his view, it pushed Western states away from relying on United Nations frameworks and toward independent military action. He finds that the Ford administration at first declined to treat the raid as a precedent. Only after West Germany’s GSG-9 unit rescued hostages from a Lufthansa aircraft at Mogadishu in October 1977 did the Carter administration create Delta Force, in December 1977. [14]

Three dramatisations appeared within a year: Victory at Entebbe (1976), Raid on Entebbe (1977) and Israel’s own Operation Thunderbolt (Mivtsa Yonatan, 1977). Menahem Golan’s Israeli film was nominated for the Academy Award for Best Foreign Language Film. [15] A later version, 7 Days in Entebbe, was released in 2018.

In Israel, the operation carries the name of its fallen commander. Its original code name was Thunderbolt, but it was renamed Operation Yonatan after Yonatan Netanyahu, the elder brother of Benjamin Netanyahu. [16] Peres told the cabinet that Israel had lost one of the finest fighters of the Jewish people. [2] Writing in 2016, Israeli commentator Uri Dromi described the raid as a message that Jews were no longer helpless, as they had been during the Holocaust, because they now had a state able to rescue them. [6]

The 50th anniversary in 2026 brought new attention to the raid. The State Archives released tens of thousands of documents, including cabinet minutes, telephone recordings and telegrams. [2] In July 2026, former hostages gathered in Jaffa to honour Sorin Hershcu, the paratrooper who was gravely wounded in the raid. [16] In August 2026, the Ugandan government unveiled a statue of Yonatan Netanyahu at Entebbe. The ceremony also honoured the four hostages who died. [17]

Sources

1. National Library of Israel. “Operation Entebbe (Operation Yonatan).” Events in Israeli History. Accessed November 2, 2026. https://www.nli.org.il/en/discover/history/events-israeli-history/operation-entebbe.
2. Cohen, Moshe. “State Archives Releases Thousands of Documents for Entebbe Rescue’s 50th Anniversary.” Jerusalem Post, June 26, 2026. https://www.jpost.com/history/article-900605.
3. United Nations Security Council. Official Records, Thirty-First Year, 1939th Meeting, 9 July 1976. S/PV.1939. New York: United Nations, 1976. Paras. 13 (Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim) and 55–139 (Chaim Herzog, Israel). https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/86947/files/S_PV-1939-EN.pdf.
4. United Nations Security Council. Official Records, 1939th Meeting. S/PV.1939. Paras. 20–39 (Juma Oris Abdalla, Uganda). https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/86947/files/S_PV-1939-EN.pdf.
5. United Nations Security Council. Official Records, 1939th Meeting. S/PV.1939. Paras. 146–160 (Kenya). https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/86947/files/S_PV-1939-EN.pdf.
6. Dromi, Uri. “How Entebbe Changed Israel.” Jewish Chronicle, June 30, 2016. https://www.thejc.com/opinion/analysis/how-entebbe-changed-israel-msc9zhc3.
7. Melman, Yossi. “Setting the Record Straight: Entebbe Was Not Auschwitz.” Haaretz, July 8, 2011. https://www.haaretz.com/1.5025753.
8. “Air France Pilot Recounts: ‘We Were Not Going to Leave the Jewish Passengers in Entebbe.’” Ynetnews, n.d. https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4820422,00.html.
9. Jewish Telegraphic Agency. “General Euphoria over Operation Redemption Continues Unabated.” July 1976. https://www.jta.org/archive/general-euphoria-over-operation-redemption-continues-unabated.
10. Kramer, Oded, and Itzik Shasho. “The British Spy Who Helped Israel Pull Off Entebbe, and Paid with His Life.” Ynetnews, May 29, 2026. https://www.ynetnews.com/magazine/article/s1negspgge.
11. United Kingdom. House of Commons. “Uganda (Mrs. Dora Bloch).” Hansard, July 12, 1976, vol. 915, cols. 39–40. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1976/jul/12/uganda-mrs-dora-bloch#column_39.
12. Jewish Telegraphic Agency. “Former Ugandan Official Ready to Testify Amin Ordered Bloch’s Death.” August 18, 1977. https://www.jta.org/archive/former-ugandan-official-ready-to-testify-amin-ordered-blochs-death.
13. United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld Library. “Security Council Meetings, 1976.” Rows S/PV.1939–S/PV.1943. Accessed November 2, 2026. https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick/meetings/1976.
14. Stagnone, Michael. “‘We Do Not See It as a Precedent’: The Entebbe Raid, Transformation of Western Counterterrorism, and American Hesitation.” Boston College eJournals. Accessed November 2, 2026. https://ejournals.bc.edu/index.php/orac/article/view/21712.
15. Jerusalem Film Center. “Operation Thunderbolt.” Accessed November 2, 2026. https://jfc.org.il/en/movie/45456-2/.
16. Jewish Telegraphic Agency. “At Entebbe Reunion, Former Hostages Say Oct. 7 Shattered Their Faith in Israel’s Promise of Rescue.” July 3, 2026. https://www.jta.org/2026/07/03/israel/at-entebbe-reunion-former-hostages-say-oct-7-shattered-their-faith-in-israels-promise-of-rescue.
17. The Citizen Reporter. “Uganda Honours Israeli PM Netanyahu’s Brother with Statue in Entebbe.” The Citizen (Dar es Salaam), August 2, 2026. https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/africa/uganda-honours-israeli-pm-netanyahu-s-brother-with-statue-in-entebbe-5544078.