India's Balancing Act

From Recognition to Special Strategic Partnership (1950 to 2026)

India recognised Israel on 17 September 1950. When Narendra Modi addressed the Knesset in 2026, he noted that this was also the day he was born [1]. Recognition did not bring full relations. For four decades India gave priority to the Non-Aligned Movement and to its ties with Arab states, and Israel kept only a consulate in Mumbai. Full diplomatic relations were established in 1992 [2]. Through the 1990s and 2000s the relationship grew mainly in defence, agriculture and water technology. Political visibility came later. Modi's 2017 trip was the first by an Indian prime minister to Israel, and his February 2026 trip was the second. The 2026 visit set new markers. In his Knesset speech Modi said India stands with Israel "firmly, with full conviction." Netanyahu described him as a brother as well as a friend, and the members gave Modi a standing ovation [1]. The Knesset gave him the Speaker of the Knesset Medal, its highest honour. He was the first foreign leader to receive it [3]. The two prime ministers raised the relationship to "A Special Strategic Partnership for Peace, Innovation & Prosperity" [4]. Briefing the press in Jerusalem, India's Foreign Secretary placed the visit inside a wider regional effort. He said it formed part of the Prime Minister's work to strengthen ties with every country in West Asia, and that in the preceding year Modi had visited Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Oman before Israel [3]. That framing is the official description of the balancing act. Israel is treated as a front-rank partner, and so are the Arab states around it.

Defence, Trade and Technology: The Working Core

Defence is the largest part of the relationship. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) measures arms transfers by volume, using its trend-indicator value, not by money paid. On that measure India was the world's second-largest recipient of major arms in 2021-25, with an 8.2 per cent share of global imports. Russia supplied 40 per cent of India's imports, France 29 per cent and Israel 15 per cent [5]. The link matters even more from the Israeli side. In the same SIPRI tables, India was the main buyer of Israeli arms in 2021-25, taking 29 per cent of Israel's exports [5]. Few other partners carry that weight for Israel's defence industry. Civilian trade is smaller and has fallen since 2023. The Indian Embassy in Tel Aviv reports total bilateral trade excluding defence. It gives US 6.53 billion for FY 2023-24 and US 3.75 billion for FY 2024-25, and it attributes the fall to the regional security situation and disrupted trade routes [2]. The Ministry of Commerce uses a narrower measure. It puts merchandise trade at about US$3.62 billion in FY 2024-25 [6]. The two figures come from different measures and are not combined here. Investment and trade policy are moving forward despite the fall. An Adani-led consortium bought Haifa Port in 2022 for US$1.18 billion [7]. The first round of free trade agreement talks ended in New Delhi, with the next round scheduled for Israel in May 2026 [6]. The February 2026 joint statement points cooperation toward future technologies. Both leaders committed to combine their countries' work in AI, cybersecurity, semiconductors, quantum computing, biotechnology, agriculture and water management, defence platforms, and space [8]. The statement presents Israel as a source of technology and India as a source of talent and manufacturing scale. That is the logic both governments give for the partnership.

Palestine Policy: Two States, Aid, and the Line on Terrorism

India's stated position on Palestine has not changed in decades. India supports a negotiated two-state solution. What changed after 7 October 2023 was how India votes when a text does not address terrorism. On 27 October 2023 the General Assembly passed a Gaza truce resolution by 120 votes to 14, with 45 abstentions. The text did not mention Hamas. India abstained, while every other South Asian state and every other BRICS member voted in favour [9]. India's Deputy Permanent Representative, Yojna Patel, called the 7 October attacks shocking and asked for the hostages to be released [10]. She urged member states to adopt a "zero-tolerance approach to terrorism." She also restated India's long-standing support for a negotiated two-state solution [9]. The abstention was part of a pattern, not a break with the past. According to a Ministry of External Affairs annexure on voting from 2019 to 2024, India voted for 54 UN resolutions on the issue and abstained on 8. Its three most recent abstentions came in October 2023, September 2024 and June 2025 [11]. India also votes for texts that Israel opposes when they match its two-state position. On 12 September 2025 the Assembly endorsed the New York Declaration on the two-state solution by 142 votes to 10, with 12 abstentions. Israel and the United States were among the 10 states voting against [12]. India voted in favour [13]. Aid runs alongside the votes. India raised its yearly contribution to UNRWA from US1.25milliontoUS5 million in 2018. Its total economic assistance to Palestine is about US141.2 million,which includes US 70.6 million in development aid and US$39 million in budget support to the Palestinian Authority [14]. In February 2026 India placed its Palestine policy inside the US-led peace effort. Both prime ministers welcomed President Trump's "Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict" [4]. In the Knesset, Modi described the Gaza Peace Initiative endorsed by the UN Security Council as a route to a just and durable peace in the region [15].

The Gulf: Diaspora, Energy, and a Corridor Through Israel

The Gulf matters to India for its people, its money and its oil. According to the Indian Embassy in Riyadh, close to 10 million Indians live in the six Gulf Cooperation Council states. Their remittances made up almost 38 per cent of all remittances India received in FY 2024-25 [16]. Closer ties with Israel have not slowed India's Gulf diplomacy. Instead, the two now meet in a shared project. On 9 September 2023 India, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, the European Union, France, Germany, Italy and the United States signed a memorandum to build the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). Its planned railway would carry goods between India, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel and Europe. The text states that it sets out political commitments and creates no legal obligations [17]. IMEC gives India, the Gulf monarchies and Israel a common economic interest. The 2026 war tested these ties directly. After the US-Israeli strikes began, Iran fired missiles and drones at Israel, at US military bases in the Gulf, and at targets in the Saudi capital and Dubai [18]. Modi phoned UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan and condemned the attack on the UAE. He also spoke to Netanyahu and stressed that keeping civilians safe must come first [19]. In the weeks that followed, New Delhi sent senior figures to the region. National Security Advisor Ajit Doval went to Saudi Arabia, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar to the UAE, and Petroleum Minister Hardeep Singh Puri to Qatar [20]. The pattern was solidarity with Gulf partners under attack, combined with direct contact with every capital involved.

Iran: Chabahar, Sanctions and the 2026 War

Before 2026, India's ties with Iran were routine. At the 19th Foreign Office Consultations in New Delhi in January 2025, the two sides reviewed Chabahar Port, trade and agriculture, and agreed to keep cooperating at the UN, BRICS and the SCO [21]. Chabahar was the centre of the relationship. The port lets Indian goods reach Afghanistan and Central Asia without crossing Pakistan. India has put close to US $120 million it had committed to the Shahid Beheshti terminal [22]. US policy then narrowed the project. In September 2025 the Trump administration revoked all exemptions to Iran sanctions, including the one for Chabahar. India secured an extension to 26 April 2026, reportedly after promising to wind down operations. Its February 2026 budget set aside no money for Chabahar, the first such omission in nearly a decade [23]. In May 2026 the Ministry of External Affairs said the matter was still under discussion with both Iran and the United States [22]. The war changed the setting. The Cabinet Committee on Security met on 1 March 2026 to review the air strikes on Iran of 28 February and the attacks in Gulf states that followed. It called for an early end to the fighting and a return to dialogue and diplomacy [24]. Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was killed in the US-Israeli strikes [18]. Iran's response struck at India's economy. The Washington Times reported that about 30 per cent of India's oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz, and that India suffered severe economic damage after Iran closed the waterway in March [25]. On 18 April 2026 Iranian forces fired on two Indian-flagged vessels and forced them out of the Strait. The Ministry of External Affairs called in Iran's ambassador, and Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri conveyed India's "deep concern" [26]. Contact with Tehran has continued all the same. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian came to New Delhi for the BRICS summit in September 2026 [25].

How the Positions Coexist, and Where They Strain

The positions fit together because India keeps each track separate and anchors its stated policy in a few fixed principles. The first principle is terrorism. In the 2026 joint statement, India and Israel condemned terrorism in all its forms, including cross-border terrorism [8]. The same line explains India's October 2023 abstention, and it links India's experience with attacks from Pakistani soil to Israel's experience of 7 October. The second principle is the two-state formula. It lets India vote for texts such as the New York Declaration and fund UNRWA without changing what it does with Israel in defence or technology. The third is material interest. The Gulf diaspora, Gulf oil, Israeli technology and the IMEC corridor all point the same way. Iran's actions in 2026, firing on Indian-flagged ships and attacking Gulf states where millions of Indians work, reduced the room for any Iranian claim on Indian sympathy.

In One Paragraph

India runs separate, parallel relationships in West Asia. Israel is a front-rank partner. India recognised it in 1950 and opened full relations in 1992. Israel supplies 15 per cent of India's arms imports, and India takes 29 per cent of Israel's arms exports. Ties became a Special Strategic Partnership after Modi addressed the Knesset in February 2026. India supports a two-state solution, gives UNRWA US$5 million a year, and voted for the New York Declaration in September 2025, but it abstains on some texts, including one in October 2023 that left out the Hamas attacks. The Gulf hosts about 10 million Indians and joins India and Israel in the IMEC corridor. Ties with Iran narrowed after Washington withdrew the Chabahar exemption and Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz and fired on Indian ships during the war that began on 28 February 2026. A shared position against terrorism, the two-state formula, and economic interest hold these positions together.

Sources

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2. Embassy of India, Tel Aviv. "Bilateral Economic Relations." Government of India. Accessed October 5, 2026.https://www.indembassyisrael.gov.in/pages?id=nel5a&subid=7ax9b.
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