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Defence & Security·Israel Defense Forces (IDF)

The Israeli Navy and Its Submarine Fleet

Reviewed 12 Nov 202612 min read13 sources
Israeli NavyDolphin-class submarinesShayetet 13Sa'ar 6Case 3000

Quick answer · ~120 words

The Israeli Navy is the smallest branch of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), but it plays an important role in protecting the country's coastline, maritime trade, offshore energy infrastructure and strategic interests. Established in 1948 from a small collection of vessels and naval personnel, it developed a distinctive approach centred on fast missile boats, submarines and specialised commandos. The 1967 sinking of INS Eilat by Soviet-made missiles exposed the vulnerability of conventional warships and accelerated this transformation. The escape of the Cherbourg boats from France in 1969 and the Israeli victory at the Battle of Latakia in 1973 demonstrated the effectiveness of the new missile-boat doctrine. Today, the navy operates German-built Dolphin-class submarines, Sa'ar 6 corvettes and the elite Shayetet 13 unit, while enforcing Israel's maritime security requirements, including the Gaza naval blockade.

Origins and the Development of a Small Navy, 1948–1966

The Israeli Navy was established during the final months of the British Mandate. On 17 March 1948, the Jewish leadership ordered the creation of a naval branch under Marine Captain Gershon Zak. Its early personnel included sailors, fishermen, port workers, coastal residents and volunteers with experience in the British Navy. The force drew heavily on the Palyam, the maritime arm of the Palmach, which had helped organise clandestine Jewish immigration to Palestine and developed underwater sabotage capabilities.[1]

When Israel declared independence in May 1948, the new navy had few purpose-built combat vessels. It initially relied on ships from the Aliya Bet fleet, which had been used to bring Jewish immigrants to Palestine and had been detained by the British. These vessels were converted for military use. During the War of Independence, the navy protected coastal routes, transported personnel and equipment, and supported operations against Egyptian forces. Naval commandos also used explosive boats and underwater sabotage against enemy vessels.

During the 1950s, Israel acquired former British destroyers and other vessels. However, the navy remained small compared with the country's land and air forces. It received a relatively limited share of defence resources, reflecting Israel's immediate need to prioritise ground forces and the air force.

The navy's strategic requirements were different from those of larger maritime powers. Israel needed to protect its Mediterranean coastline, secure access to the port of Eilat on the Red Sea and maintain maritime trade routes. It therefore began moving towards smaller, faster vessels capable of carrying powerful weapons rather than attempting to build a large conventional fleet.

This approach became increasingly important as neighbouring Arab states acquired Soviet-built missile boats and other modern naval equipment.[2]

The Sinking of INS Eilat and the Missile-Boat Revolution, 1967–1973

On 21 October 1967, the Israeli destroyer INS Eilat was patrolling off the Sinai coast when Egyptian missile boats fired Soviet-made P-15 Styx anti-ship missiles at it. The ship was hit and sank. Forty-seven Israeli sailors were killed and dozens were wounded.[3]

The attack was a turning point in naval warfare. It demonstrated that relatively small missile boats could destroy much larger warships from a considerable distance. For Israel, it exposed the vulnerability of its conventional destroyers and reinforced the need for a different naval doctrine.

The navy had already begun developing such a force. In the early 1960s, it contracted French shipyards at Cherbourg to build twelve fast missile boats. The vessels were designed around an Israeli concept: relatively small platforms equipped with advanced sensors, electronic countermeasures and anti-ship missiles. Israel was also developing the Gabriel missile, intended to give its boats a weapon suited to engagements with larger enemy vessels.

The French arms embargo imposed by President Charles de Gaulle complicated the programme. Seven boats had reached Israel before the embargo was extended to cover the remaining vessels. Five completed boats remained in Cherbourg, despite Israel having paid for them.

On Christmas Eve 1969, Israeli crews secretly sailed the five boats out of Cherbourg. The operation involved a complicated arrangement through which the vessels were formally sold to a Norwegian intermediary. Israeli sailors had travelled to France in civilian clothing, and support ships were organised to refuel the boats during their long voyage to Israel. The five vessels reached Haifa on 31 December 1969. The episode became known as the Cherbourg boats affair.[4]

The boats were subsequently equipped and integrated into Israel's missile-boat fleet. The experience also strengthened the country's defence-industrial capabilities, particularly in missile development, electronic warfare and naval systems.

The Battle of Latakia and the 1973 Yom Kippur War

The new missile-boat doctrine was tested during the Yom Kippur War. On the night of 6–7 October 1973, Israeli missile boats engaged Syrian naval vessels off the Syrian port of Latakia. The engagement is generally recognised as the first naval battle in which both sides used ship-launched anti-ship missiles.

The Syrian vessels fired Soviet-built Styx missiles. Israeli boats used electronic countermeasures, decoys and evasive manoeuvres to avoid the incoming weapons. They then closed the distance and fired Israeli-built Gabriel missiles.

The engagement ended with the destruction of five Syrian vessels, including missile boats, a torpedo boat and a minesweeper, without the loss of an Israeli vessel. Further engagements off the Egyptian coast, including the Battle of Baltim on 8–9 October, produced additional Israeli successes.[5]

The battles demonstrated the effectiveness of the Israeli approach. Rather than competing with larger Arab navies in the number and size of ships, Israel had developed a force built around smaller platforms, electronic warfare, missiles and coordinated tactics.

The naval victories also helped protect Israel's maritime supply routes during the war. The experience confirmed the importance of technology and tactical preparation in compensating for numerical disadvantages.

Shayetet 13: Israel's Naval Commandos

Shayetet 13 is the Israeli Navy's elite special operations unit. Its origins lie in the underwater sabotage and maritime commando groups established during the pre-state period and the War of Independence. These units were formally brought together on 1 January 1950 to create the naval commando formation.[6]

The unit conducts operations at sea, on land and in the air. Its responsibilities include maritime reconnaissance, underwater demolition, intelligence collection, counterterrorism and special operations against enemy maritime infrastructure. It can also support wider IDF operations by gathering intelligence and conducting missions in difficult coastal environments.

Its personnel undergo extensive training in infantry combat, diving, naval warfare, parachuting and specialised assault techniques. The unit operates in coordination with other IDF formations and uses specialised boats, diving equipment and underwater systems.

Shayetet 13 has participated in several major Israeli military operations. Its missions are often classified, but the unit has become one of the most prominent formations in the IDF. Its role reflects the importance of special operations in a navy whose size limits the number of conventional vessels it can deploy.

The Dolphin-Class Submarines and Case 3000

Submarines became another important part of Israel's naval strategy. They provide capabilities that surface vessels cannot easily replicate, including covert intelligence collection, surveillance, special operations support and long-duration underwater patrols. Their precise operational missions are not publicly disclosed.

Israel's current submarine fleet is based on German-built Dolphin-class vessels. The first three submarines—INS Dolphin, INS Leviathan and INS Tekuma—were built in Germany and entered Israeli service between 1999 and 2000. The next generation, commonly known as the Dolphin II class, includes INS Tanin and INS Rahav. These larger vessels incorporate air-independent propulsion, allowing them to remain submerged for longer periods.[7]

The third Dolphin II submarine, INS Drakon, was formally handed over in Germany in September 2026 and began its voyage to Israel. It completes the delivery of the three Dolphin II vessels. The submarines are built by Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems, with German government financial support forming part of the procurement arrangements.[8]

The fleet's procurement history became the subject of a major political and legal controversy known as Case 3000, or the submarine affair. The investigation concerned alleged bribery, fraud and improper influence surrounding Israeli purchases of submarines and naval vessels from Thyssenkrupp during the period 2009–2017. Several businessmen and former officials were investigated, and a number of individuals faced criminal proceedings. The allegations included claims that intermediaries had used political and official connections to influence defence procurement.

The affair also raised questions about the decision to purchase additional submarines, the procurement of four Sa'ar 6 corvettes and Germany's sale of submarines to Egypt. Benjamin Netanyahu was not indicted in the criminal Case 3000, and he has denied wrongdoing.

A separate State Commission of Inquiry, established in 2022, examined the decision-making processes behind naval procurement and related arrangements. In January 2026, the commission reported systemic failures in the way naval purchases had been handled, finding that the absence of clear policy and orderly decision-making had endangered national security and harmed Israel's foreign relations and economic interests. Its findings on individual responsibility remained subject to further legal proceedings at the time of its public announcement.[9]

The distinction between the criminal investigation and the state commission is important. Case 3000 concerns alleged criminal conduct by individuals, while the commission examined institutional and political decision-making. The affair demonstrated the need for transparency and professional oversight in strategic defence procurement.

Sa'ar 6 Corvettes and the Protection of Offshore Gas Infrastructure

The discovery and development of offshore natural gas fields increased the importance of Israel's maritime security. Fields such as Tamar and Leviathan are located in the eastern Mediterranean and support Israel's domestic energy supply and export plans. Their platforms and associated infrastructure are strategic economic assets that require protection against attack.

To strengthen this protection, Israel ordered four Sa'ar 6-class corvettes from German shipbuilder Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems. The vessels are approximately 90 metres long and designed to combine surveillance, air defence, anti-ship capabilities and protection of offshore infrastructure.

The ships carry advanced radar and defensive systems, including the naval version of Iron Dome and Barak 8 surface-to-air missiles. They also have helipads and facilities for operating helicopters. Their purpose includes defending gas platforms, maritime approaches and other strategic assets in Israel's exclusive economic zone.[10]

The first Sa'ar 6 corvette, INS Magen, arrived in Israel in 2020. The remaining three vessels followed. The introduction of the class expanded the navy's ability to defend offshore energy infrastructure against missile, aerial and maritime threats.

The State Comptroller has also highlighted the importance of ensuring that the corvettes become fully operational and that the navy's force structure matches the changing threats to Israel's maritime economic zone.[11]

The Gaza Naval Blockade and the Mavi Marmara Incident

Israel's naval responsibilities also include enforcing maritime restrictions on the Gaza Strip. Following Hamas's takeover of Gaza in June 2007, Israel and Egypt imposed restrictions on the movement of goods and people. Israel formally declared a naval blockade of Gaza on 3 January 2009, stating that its purpose was to prevent weapons and military supplies from reaching Hamas and other armed groups by sea.

The blockade became internationally controversial, particularly after the 31 May 2010 incident involving the Gaza Freedom Flotilla. The flotilla included the Turkish-flagged Mavi Marmara, which was carrying activists and humanitarian supplies towards Gaza.

Israeli forces intercepted the vessels in international waters, approximately 72 nautical miles from the coast. During the boarding of the Mavi Marmara, Israeli commandos encountered violent resistance from a group of passengers. Nine passengers were killed during the operation, and several Israeli soldiers and passengers were wounded. A tenth passenger later died from his injuries.[12]

The incident caused a major diplomatic crisis between Israel and Turkey and prompted several international investigations. The UN Secretary-General's Panel of Inquiry, chaired by former New Zealand Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer, concluded in its 2011 report that Israel's naval blockade was a legitimate security measure under international law and that Israel could enforce it at sea. However, the panel also criticised the way the boarding operation was conducted, stating that the use of force resulted in unacceptable loss of life and that non-violent alternatives should have been attempted first.

The UN Human Rights Council's separate fact-finding mission reached a different legal assessment, describing the interception as unlawful and criticising the conduct of Israeli forces. The differing conclusions reflected the competing legal and factual interpretations of the incident.[13]

Israel has maintained that the naval blockade is necessary to prevent weapons from reaching Hamas by sea. The blockade and the wider restrictions on Gaza remain subjects of international legal and political debate. The navy continues to enforce maritime restrictions as part of Israel's security policy.

Sources

  1. Israel Defense Forces. “Israeli Navy.” IDF. https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/israeli-navy/; Palyam. “The Birth of the Israeli Navy.” https://palyam.org/English/INF/mainpage.php.
  2. Nir Maor. “Formation of Navy Part II – The Israeli Defence Force Navy, 1960–1979.” The Navy, vol. 79, no. 1 (January 2017). https://navyleague.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Navy-V79N1_Jan_2017.pdf.
  3. Israel Ministry of Defense and IDF Archives. “INS Eilat.” https://archives.mod.gov.il/sites/English/Exhibitions/Pages/INS-Eilat.aspx; “The Sinking of INS Eilat.” The Naval Review. https://www.naval-review.com/.
  4. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian. “Telegram from the Embassy in France to the Department of State Regarding the Cherbourg Boats.” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, vol. 41. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v41/d137; Norman Friedman. “From ‘Futuristic Whimsy’ to Naval Reality.” Naval History Magazine, June 2014. https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2014/june/futuristic-whimsy-naval-reality.
  5. Naval Postgraduate School. “An Analysis of Small Navy Tactics,” section on the 1973 Yom Kippur War naval missile battles. https://calhoun.nps.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/54bfc24b-804d-4ab5-984e-3532b59c0181/content; Jewish Virtual Library. “The Boats of Cherbourg.” https://jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/Cherbourg.html.
  6. Israel Defense Forces. “Shayetet 13.” IDF. https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/our-units/elite-units/shayetet-13/; Palyam. “The Birth of the Israeli Navy.” https://palyam.org/English/INF/mainpage.php.
  7. Eric Wertheim. “Dolphin-class Submarines: Israel’s Undersea Arsenal.” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 2024. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/june/dolphin-class-submarines-israels-undersea-arsenal.
  8. Israel Ministry of Defense. “Years of Joint Work Become an Operational Reality: INS Drakon En Route from Germany to Israel.” 1 September 2026. https://www.mod.gov.il/en/press-releases/press-room/years-of-joint-work-become-an-operational-reality-ins-drakon-en-route-from-germany-to-israel.
  9. Israel Democracy Institute. “Official State Commission Sends Warning Letters in Submarine Acquisition Inquiry.” 27 June 2024. https://en.idi.org.il/articles/54778; Jeremy Sharon and Times of Israel Staff. “Submarine Affair Probe Finds ‘Systemic Failings’ Endangered State Security.” The Times of Israel, 25 January 2026. https://www.timesofisrael.com/submarine-affair-probe-finds-systemic-failings-endangered-state-security/; Knesset. “Following Uproar over Cancelled Vote, Knesset Rejects Motion for Parliamentary Investigation of Submarines Affair.” 21 October 2020. https://main.knesset.gov.il/EN/News/PressReleases/Pages/press211020c.aspx.
  10. Israel Defense Forces. “Meet the Sa'ar 6-class Corvette Boat.” IDF. https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/israeli-navy/meet-the-sa-ar-6-class-corvette-boat/.
  11. State Comptroller of Israel. “The Missile Boats in the Defense of the Maritime Space in Combat.” Annual Audit Report, February 2023. https://library.mevaker.gov.il/sites/DigitalLibrary/Pages/Reports/7577-19.aspx.
  12. United Nations. “Gaza Aid Flotilla Incident – Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Inquiry (Palmer Report).” September 2011. https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-205969/.
  13. United Nations Human Rights Council. “Report of the International Fact-Finding Mission to Investigate Violations of International Law Resulting from the Israeli Attacks on the Flotilla of Ships Carrying Humanitarian Assistance.” A/HRC/15/21, 27 September 2010. https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-208679/; United Nations. “Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 Flotilla Incident.” September 2011. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/720841/files/966717_E.pdf.