Moshe Dayan

Early Life, the Haganah and the War of Independence (1915–1949)

Moshe Dayan was born on 20 May 1915 at Degania, near the Sea of Galilee, in what was then Ottoman Palestine. Degania was the first kibbutz, a form of collective farming settlement established by Jewish pioneers. Dayan grew up in Nahalal, an early moshav where families farmed their own plots while sharing certain services and responsibilities. His father, Shmuel Dayan, was active in the Jewish agricultural settlement movement and later became a member of Israel’s first Knesset, or parliament. [1]

Dayan grew up in a community where farming, settlement and defence were closely connected. Jewish communities faced attacks and security threats, and many young people joined local defence groups. In 1933, Dayan joined the Haganah, the main Jewish defence organisation in Mandatory Palestine. He also served with the Special Night Squads, a joint British-Jewish unit established by British officer Orde Wingate to fight armed groups operating in northern Palestine. [2]

In 1939, British authorities arrested Dayan and other Haganah members for participating in an unauthorised military training course. He was imprisoned at Acre for two years. After his release, he joined Australian forces operating against Vichy French forces in Syria in 1941. During the fighting, a bullet struck the binoculars through which he was looking, destroying his left eye. He later became famous for wearing a black eye patch. [2]

During Israel’s War of Independence in 1948, Dayan commanded military forces in several areas. He led the 89th Battalion in operations against Arab forces and later became commander of the Jerusalem district. He also took part in negotiations with Jordanian representatives. These early experiences gave him both battlefield experience and an understanding of the importance of direct negotiations with neighbouring states. [1]

Building Israel’s Army and the Sinai Campaign (1949–1958)

After the War of Independence, Dayan held several senior military positions. He commanded the Southern Command and Northern Command before becoming Chief of the General Staff of the IDF on 6 December 1953. He remained in the position until January 1958. [2]

Israel faced serious security challenges during these years. Armed infiltrators crossed its borders, and attacks affected Israeli farms and border communities. Egyptian-backed fedayeen operated from the Gaza Strip, then under Egyptian administration. Jordanian territory was also a route for infiltration across the armistice lines. Israeli leaders feared that continued attacks would threaten the safety of civilians and undermine the security of the young state.

Dayan supported a more mobile and aggressive military. He strengthened combat units and backed reprisal operations intended to deter further attacks. His approach emphasised speed, initiative and the ability to strike enemy forces before they could threaten Israeli communities. These policies remain part of the debate over Israel’s early military strategy, but they helped establish Dayan’s reputation as a commander who believed that deterrence was essential to the survival of a small state surrounded by hostile forces.

In 1956, Dayan played a leading role in the Sinai Campaign, also known as Operation Kadesh. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser had nationalised the Suez Canal Company and restricted Israeli shipping through the Straits of Tiran. Israel also faced continued attacks from the Gaza border. Israeli, British and French leaders reached a secret agreement to coordinate military action against Egypt. [3]

Israeli forces entered the Sinai Peninsula on 29 October 1956. The IDF advanced rapidly and defeated Egyptian forces in several engagements. Dayan helped direct the campaign and personally commanded Israeli forces during the operation. International pressure, particularly from the United States, eventually led Israel to withdraw from Sinai in 1957. [3]

The campaign demonstrated the IDF’s ability to conduct rapid operations over difficult terrain. It also showed that military victories had to be weighed against diplomatic realities and relations with major powers. Dayan left the army in 1958 and entered politics. From 1959 to 1964, he served as Minister of Agriculture under Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion. He later joined Ben-Gurion’s breakaway Rafi party. [1]

The Six-Day War and the Temple Mount (1967)

By the spring of 1967, tensions between Israel and neighbouring Arab states had risen sharply. Egypt moved troops into Sinai, demanded the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force and closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. Syria and Jordan also became involved in the growing crisis. Israel’s leaders feared a major war on several fronts. Diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis did not produce a solution acceptable to Israel. [4]

On 1 June 1967, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol appointed Dayan Defence Minister. Four days later, Israel launched air strikes against Egyptian airfields, beginning the Six-Day War. Israel subsequently defeated Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian forces and captured the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. The victory transformed Israel’s strategic position and brought the Old City of Jerusalem, including the Western Wall, under Israeli control. [4]

Dayan became one of the most recognisable figures of the victory. His public image represented confidence at a time when many Israelis had feared that their country might face a devastating war. Yet he also understood that military success created new political and religious challenges.

On 7 June, Israeli paratroopers reached the Temple Mount, known to Muslims as Haram al-Sharif. The site contains the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock and is central to Muslim religious life. It is also the location of the ancient Jewish Temples and Judaism’s holiest site.

Dayan decided that Israel should maintain overall security control while allowing the Muslim religious authorities, known as the Waqf, to continue managing the compound’s daily religious affairs. He ordered the Israeli flag removed after it was raised over the site. The arrangement allowed Muslim worship to continue under Waqf administration, while Israel retained responsibility for security and control of access to the wider area. [5]

The Israeli government also passed the Protection of Holy Places Law on 27 June 1967. It provided for the protection of holy places and access to them. [6]

Dayan’s decision reflected a practical calculation: Israel had won the war, but it also needed to avoid turning control of Jerusalem’s holy sites into a wider religious conflict. The arrangement has remained controversial. Some Israelis regard it as a wise decision that helped preserve religious stability; others argue that it limited Israel’s practical authority at Judaism’s holiest site. Its long-term effects continue to shape debates over Jerusalem.

The Yom Kippur War and Political Decline (1973–1974)

On 6 October 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a coordinated surprise attack on Israel during Yom Kippur, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar. Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal, while Syrian forces attacked Israeli positions in the Golan Heights. Israel had not fully prepared for the scale and timing of the assault. Dayan was Defence Minister, and the initial setbacks placed him under intense pressure. [7]

The first days of the war were extremely difficult. Israeli forces suffered heavy losses as they tried to stop the attacks and organise a counteroffensive. Israel eventually recovered, crossed the Suez Canal into Egypt and pushed Syrian forces back. The fighting ended with a ceasefire later in October. According to Israel’s Defense Establishment Archive, Israel suffered 2,689 military deaths, alongside thousands of wounded and hundreds of prisoners. [7]

The military recovery did not erase the shock of the initial surprise. Israelis had expected their army and intelligence services to provide stronger warning and a faster response. Dayan’s public standing fell sharply, and many citizens questioned whether he had understood the danger before the war.

The government established the Agranat Commission to investigate the intelligence failures and military preparedness that had contributed to the surprise. Its findings led to the removal or resignation of several senior military officials, including Chief of Staff David Elazar. The commission did not recommend Dayan’s removal, but its conclusions did not end the debate over political responsibility. [8]

Dayan defended his decisions and argued that he had relied on the intelligence assessments available to the government. Critics maintained that a Defence Minister had a duty to question those assessments and ensure that the armed forces were ready for a possible attack. This remains one of the most disputed parts of his career.

Prime Minister Golda Meir resigned in April 1974, amid the wider political fallout from the war. When Yitzhak Rabin formed a new government in June, Dayan was not included. His departure marked the end of his period as one of the central figures in Israel’s military leadership. Nevertheless, the lessons of 1973 also led Israel to reconsider intelligence procedures, military readiness and the relationship between political leaders and senior commanders. [8]

From Defence Minister to Peacemaker (1977–1981)

Dayan returned to government in 1977 after Menachem Begin and Likud won the general election. Begin appointed him Foreign Minister, even though Dayan had previously belonged to the Labour movement. The appointment reflected Begin’s desire to use Dayan’s military experience, international standing and knowledge of Arab leaders to advance Israel’s diplomatic interests. [9]

Dayan’s most important diplomatic achievement was his role in opening a secret channel to Egypt. On 16 September 1977, he met Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister Hassan Tuhami in Morocco. King Hassan II helped arrange the meeting. The discussions created a channel through which Israel and Egypt could explore direct negotiations without immediately exposing the talks to public pressure. [10]

The contacts helped prepare the way for Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s historic visit to Jerusalem in November 1977. Sadat addressed the Knesset and made clear that Egypt was prepared to pursue peace directly with Israel. The visit was a major turning point: the leader of Israel’s largest Arab military opponent had travelled to Jerusalem to discuss ending the conflict. [9]

In September 1978, Begin, Sadat and US President Jimmy Carter met at Camp David. Their negotiations produced agreements that established a framework for peace between Israel and Egypt. On 26 March 1979, the two countries signed a formal peace treaty in Washington. The treaty established diplomatic relations and security arrangements and set out Israel’s withdrawal from Sinai. [11]

The agreement required Israel to make a major territorial concession, including the evacuation of Israeli settlements in Sinai. In return, Israel gained peace with Egypt, an important Arab state with a large military. Dayan’s contribution lay in using his security credentials and direct contacts to help turn years of hostility into a diplomatic agreement. The treaty became a major milestone in Israel’s search for secure borders and regional acceptance.

However, Dayan later disagreed with Begin over negotiations concerning Palestinian autonomy. Dayan believed the talks were not progressing in a way that could produce a workable political arrangement. He resigned as Foreign Minister in 1979. [12]

In 1981, he founded the Telem party, which advocated a different approach to the administration of Palestinian residents in the territories captured in 1967. The party won two seats in that year’s election. Dayan died on 16 October 1981, at the age of 66. [1]

Legacy

Moshe Dayan remains one of the most influential figures in Israel’s military and political history. His rise from the Haganah to the leadership of the IDF reflected the experience of a generation that built Israel’s defence institutions during the struggle for independence.

As Chief of the General Staff, he emphasised mobility, initiative and deterrence. During the 1956 Sinai Campaign and the 1967 Six-Day War, he helped direct military operations that changed Israel’s strategic position. His decisions after the capture of Jerusalem’s Old City also demonstrated that military control sometimes required political and religious restraint.

His legacy is not without serious failures. The surprise attack in October 1973 exposed weaknesses in Israel’s intelligence assessments and preparedness, and Dayan’s role remains a subject of debate. His reputation suffered, even though the Agranat Commission did not recommend his removal.

His diplomatic work deserves equal attention. By helping establish secret contacts with Egypt, Dayan contributed to a process that led to the 1979 peace treaty. That agreement required difficult concessions, but it ended the state of war between Israel and Egypt and became a cornerstone of Israel’s regional security.

Dayan’s career therefore illustrates two connected principles in Israeli history: the need for a strong defence against threats to the state, and the value of diplomacy when it can secure a lasting peace. His achievements and mistakes alike continue to inform debates about Israel’s security, leadership and relations with its neighbours.

In One Paragraph

Moshe Dayan (1915–1981) was an Israeli military commander and statesman who rose from the Haganah to become Chief of the General Staff, Defence Minister and Foreign Minister. He helped lead the 1956 Sinai Campaign and played a central role in Israel’s victory in the Six-Day War of 1967. His decision to leave daily religious administration of the Temple Mount to the Muslim Waqf shaped the site’s modern arrangements. The surprise attack of October 1973 damaged his reputation and raised questions about his judgment. Yet his secret contacts with Egypt helped pave the way for the 1979 peace treaty, one of Israel’s most important diplomatic achievements. Dayan’s legacy combines military determination, political controversy and a lasting contribution to peace.

Sources

1. Knesset. “Moshe Dayan.” All Past and Present MKs. https://main.knesset.gov.il/en/MK/APPS/mk/mk-personal-details/688.
2. Israel Defense Forces. “Lt. Gen. Moshe Dayan (1953–1958).” Past Chiefs of Staff. https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/past-chiefs-of-staff/lt-gen-moshe-dayan-1953-1958/.
3. Israel Defense and Security Establishment Archive. “Operation Kadesh – The Suez Crisis 1956.” https://archives.mod.gov.il/sites/English/Exhibitions/Pages/Operation-Kadesh.aspx.
4. Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State. “The 1967 Arab-Israeli War.” Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations, 1961–1968. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/arab-israeli-war-1967.
5. Yeshivat Har Etzion. “7 June, 1967: ‘Har Ha-bayit Be-yadeinu’: The Six-Day War and Reunification of Yerushalayim.” https://www.etzion.org.il/en/node/31703.
6. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Protection of Holy Places Law, 1967.” Adopted by the Knesset June 27, 1967, §§ 1–2. https://www.gov.il/en/pages/14-protection-of-holy-places-law.
7. Israel Defense and Security Establishment Archive. “Moshe Dayan.” 50 Years Since the Yom Kippur War. https://yomkipurwar.mod.gov.il/persons/Pages/MosheDayan.aspx.
8. Israel Defense and Security Establishment Archive. “The Agranat Commission.” https://archives.mod.gov.il/sites/English/docs/agranat/Pages/default.aspx. See also “The ‘Agranat Commission’ Report.” https://archives.mod.gov.il/sites/English/docs/agranat/Pages/AgranatReport.aspx.
9. Knesset. “Menachem Begin.” The Knesset. https://m.knesset.gov.il/EN/About/Pages/begin.aspx.
10. Center for Israel Education. “Moshe Dayan and Hassan Tuhami, September 16, 1977.” https://israeled.org/moshe-dayan-secret-talks.
11. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty.” https://embassies.gov.il/egypt/en/node/6405. See also Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, “Camp David Accords and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process,” https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/camp-david.
12. Associated Press. “Moshe Dayan Resigns over Palestinian Issue.” University Daily Kansan, October 22, 1979. University of Kansas Digital Collections. https://digital.lib.ku.edu/islandora/object/ku-udk%3A24631/datastream/OCR/download.