Israel's Defence and Security

What doctrine guides Israel's defence, and how does the security establishment shape politics?

Israeli defence doctrine starts from ideas that David Ben-Gurion, the first prime minister, set out in the 1950s. Israel had a small population, little territory and hostile neighbours, and it could not afford long wars. Ben-Gurion's answer rested on three pillars. Deterrence was meant to discourage attack. Early warning was meant to show in time that an attack was coming. Decisive victory meant carrying the fight into enemy territory and ending it fast. In August 2015 the IDF published its first public strategy document, written under Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot. It kept the three pillars and formally added a fourth, defence, because rockets, missiles and tunnels built by non-state groups could now reach Israel's civilian home front [1]. Behind this doctrine is a small standing army of conscripts and career soldiers, backed by a large reserve. Reservists hold civilian jobs and need time to mobilise, which is why early warning carries so much weight. When warning fails, the standing army must hold alone for the first hours or days. The cost of the system rose after October 2023. SIPRI estimates that Israel's military spending grew by 65 % in real terms in 2024, to $46.5 billion. That was the steepest annual rise since the 1967 war. Spending reached 8.8 % of gross domestic product, the second-highest share in the world [2]. The "security establishment" is the term Israelis use for the IDF, the Ministry of Defence, the Shin Bet (internal security), the Mossad (foreign intelligence) and the National Security Council. Its senior officers often move into politics after retiring. Yitzhak Rabin and Ehud Barak were chiefs of staff before becoming prime minister. Former chiefs of staff Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot later led their own parties. Because the IDF drafts most Jewish citizens, military service shapes careers and public trust, and questions about who serves become political questions. The clearest current example is the Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) draft. The Defence Service Law of 1986 requires military service. Since the state's early years, however, full-time yeshiva students have received deferrals that in practice became exemptions. The Supreme Court struck down the Tal Law deferral scheme in 2012 and a later amendment in 2017. On 25 June 2024, in HCJ 6198/23, the High Court of Justice ruled on three points. The government had no legal authority to grant a blanket exemption. The state had to enforce the law on yeshiva students. There was no legal basis to keep funding yeshivas for students whose service had not been lawfully deferred [3]. On 14 July 2026 the Knesset passed a law barring the arrest of Haredi draft evaders. Several coalition members voted against it, and Deputy Foreign Minister Sharren Haskel resigned from the government. Within minutes of the vote, the Movement for Quality Government and two opposition parties petitioned the High Court against the law [4].

How are the air force, navy, armoured corps and special forces organised, and where do women serve?

The Israeli Air Force is the IDF's long-range strike arm. On the first morning of the June 1967 war it struck Egyptian airfields and destroyed most of Egypt's air force on the ground. It bombed Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981 and a Syrian reactor site in 2007. It flies US-built F-15, F-16 and F-35I "Adir" fighters. It also commands most of Israel's drones and its ground-based air-defence batteries. Reserve aircrew keep flying into middle age. The navy is small. Its corvettes, including the German-built Sa'ar 6 class, patrol the coast and guard the offshore gas fields that fuel much of Israel's electricity. Its Dolphin-class submarines, also built in Germany, give it reach far beyond Israel's coast. Its commando flotilla, Shayetet 13, is one of the IDF's elite units. The Armoured Corps fights mainly in the Merkava ("Chariot") tank. Israel designed the Merkava after Britain withdrew from a plan to supply Chieftain tanks in the late 1960s. Its designer, General Israel Tal, placed the engine at the front to shield the crew, and he added a rear door so crews can leave the tank under cover. The Merkava Mark 1 entered service in 1979. Later models carry Rafael's Trophy active-protection system, which detects incoming anti-tank rockets and destroys them before impact. The Merkava has fought in every major Israeli ground campaign since the 1982 Lebanon war. Every service has special forces. Sayeret Matkal, the General Staff Reconnaissance Unit, carries out the most sensitive missions, and it led the 1976 rescue of hostages at Entebbe in Uganda. The air force runs Shaldag and the rescue unit 669. The ground forces run a commando brigade that includes Egoz, Maglan and Duvdevan. Women are conscripted for a shorter term than men, and for decades most combat posts were closed to them. In November 1995, in Miller v. Minister of Defence, the Supreme Court ruled by three votes to two that the air force could not bar all women from the pilots' course. The army had argued that women's shorter reserve duty made the cost of training them unjustified. The majority held that budget and planning reasons did not justify a blanket ban [5]. Women have since flown combat aircraft and served in mixed infantry battalions, in artillery and in border-defence tank crews. In April 2026, in Kliger v. Minister of Defence, the court ruled on petitions to open all combat units to women. The state's figures, cited in the judgment, put the share of women in combat roles at 3 % in 2012. The judgment records that trials for women had since opened in Sayeret Matkal and Unit 669. It also addresses the demand to open the manoeuvring armoured formation to women [6].

What do IAI, Rafael and Elbit make, and how do air defence, drones and cyber operations fit together?

Israel's defence industry grew from a wish to avoid depending on foreign suppliers. The lesson came from arms embargoes, including France's in 1967. Three firms dominate the industry. Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) is state-owned. It began in 1953 as an aircraft maintenance company. It now builds military satellites, radars and the Heron family of long-endurance drones. With Boeing, it builds the Arrow missile interceptors, and it developed the Barak 8 air-defence missile with India. Rafael Advanced Defense Systems is also state-owned and grew out of the IDF's science corps. It makes the Iron Dome interceptor, the Trophy tank-protection system, Spike anti-tank missiles and Python air-to-air missiles. It developed David's Sling with the US firm Raytheon, and it has developed Iron Beam, a laser system for destroying rockets and drones. Elbit Systems is private and listed in Tel Aviv and New York. It makes Hermes drones, artillery, night-vision and targeting equipment, electronic-warfare systems and soldier radios. In 2018 it bought IMI Systems, the former state munitions maker. Exports help pay for research. The Ministry of Defence reported record exports of $19.2 billion in 2025. That was a rise of nearly 30 % over 2024 and the fifth record year in a row. Government-to-government deals made up about $10 billion of the total [7]. Air defence is built in layers:

• Iron Dome intercepts short-range rockets and mortar shells. It fires only at projectiles predicted to hit populated areas.
• David's Sling covers the middle tier: heavy rockets, cruise missiles and short-range ballistic missiles.
• Arrow 2 intercepts ballistic missiles high in the atmosphere, and Arrow 3 intercepts them in space.

Arrow was funded jointly with the United States, and Germany became the first foreign buyer of Arrow 3. The layers faced large attacks in April and October 2024, when Iran fired hundreds of missiles and drones directly at Israel, and again in the Iran wars of 2025 and 2026. Israel was among the first states to use drones in combat. In the 1982 Lebanon war, small Israeli drones helped locate Syrian air-defence radars in the Beqaa Valley before air strikes. IAI's Harop, a drone that dives onto its target, has since been sold to and used by foreign customers. Cyber operations are the newest layer. Military Intelligence's Unit 8200 handles signals intelligence and much of Israel's offensive cyber work. The best-known case is Stuxnet, a computer worm discovered in 2010. It damaged centrifuges at Iran's Natanz enrichment plant by altering their speed while showing operators normal readings. The United States and Israel are widely reported to have built it, and neither government has confirmed this. Jon Lindsay's peer-reviewed study concludes that Stuxnet delayed Iran's programme only modestly and briefly, and that it showed the limits of cyber attack as well as its uses [8].

How does Israel approach counter-terrorism, targeted killings and the security barrier?

Israeli counter-terrorism combines intelligence gathering, arrests, raids, air strikes and physical barriers. The Shin Bet leads intelligence work in the West Bank and Gaza. The IDF and police carry out most arrests and raids. Targeted killing, the deliberate killing of a named person, has been part of this approach for decades. After 11 Israeli athletes were killed at the 1972 Munich Olympics, the Mossad hunted down members of the group responsible. In 1996 Israel killed Hamas bomb-maker Yahya Ayyash, and in 2004 it killed Hamas founder Ahmed Yassin in an air strike. During the Second Intifada, which began in 2000, targeted killing became an openly stated policy. In December 2006 the Supreme Court ruled on a petition against the policy. It held that members of armed groups are civilians under international law, but that civilians lose protection "for such time" as they take a direct part in hostilities. Targeted killings are therefore neither always banned nor always allowed. Each case must meet the test of proportionality, be examined in advance, and face an independent investigation afterwards [9]. Since October 2023 Israel has killed senior commanders of Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran's Revolutionary Guards, including Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut in September 2024. The security barrier also came out of the Second Intifada. The government approved it in 2002, after a wave of suicide bombings inside Israel. Most of it is fence, with concrete wall sections in built-up areas such as Jerusalem. Much of its route runs inside the West Bank rather than along the 1949 armistice line, the Green Line. On 9 July 2004 the International Court of Justice gave an advisory opinion requested by the UN General Assembly. By 14 votes to 1, it found that building the wall in occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, was contrary to international law. It said Israel should stop construction, take down the sections built there and pay reparation [10]. Advisory opinions are not binding, and Israel rejected this one. Israel's own High Court, in the 2004 Beit Sourik case, accepted the barrier's security purpose. It still ordered parts of the route moved because they harmed Palestinian villagers out of proportion to the security gained. Israeli officials credit the barrier with the drop in suicide bombings. Other analysts also point to intelligence work and army operations inside West Bank cities. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) is the second-largest armed group in Gaza after Hamas. It was founded in the early 1980s, drew inspiration from the Iranian revolution, and receives money and weapons from Iran. Unlike Hamas, it has not tried to govern and has boycotted elections. Israel fought short rounds against PIJ alone in August 2022 and May 2023. Hamas stayed out of these rounds, and some Israeli officials read this as evidence that Hamas was deterred [11]. PIJ fighters joined the 7 October attack and held hostages in Gaza. In the West Bank, PIJ-linked groups have operated from the Jenin and Tulkarm refugee camps.

What are the external fronts: Iran's network, the Houthis and Syria?

Since the 1980s Iran has built a network of allied armed groups around Israel, which its leaders call the "axis of resistance." It includes:

• Hezbollah in Lebanon, founded in 1982 with Iranian help
• Hamas and PIJ in Gaza
• Shia militias in Iraq
• the Houthis in Yemen

Until December 2024, Bashar al-Assad's Syria was the land route for Iranian weapons to Hezbollah. Before October 2023, Israel fought this network mainly through the "campaign between the wars." This was a long series of covert actions and air strikes, many of them in Syria, meant to stop arms transfers and slow Iran's build-up near Israel's borders [11]. After 7 October 2023 the network opened several fronts. Hezbollah fired on northern Israel from 8 October, and tens of thousands of Israelis left their homes. In September 2024 Israel escalated, killed Nasrallah and sent ground forces into southern Lebanon, before a ceasefire in November 2024. Iran fired missiles and drones directly at Israel for the first time in April 2024, and again on 1 October 2024 [11]. In June 2025 Israel, followed by the United States, struck Iran's nuclear and military sites. The US State Department's legal adviser later argued that this conflict never formally ended, and cited an Israeli letter to the Security Council dated 10 March 2026 [12]. On 28 February 2026 the United States and Israel began a joint campaign against Iran [13]. The White House announced a ceasefire on 8 April 2026 and said the campaign had met its aims in 38 days [14]. The Houthis, also called Ansar Allah, have controlled northern Yemen and the capital, Sanaa, since 2014. From October 2023 they fired drones and missiles at Israel and attacked ships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, including ships with no link to Israel [15]. On 10 January 2024 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2722. It demanded that the Houthis stop attacking merchant and commercial vessels and asked for monthly reports on the attacks [16]. Israel struck the Houthi-held port of Hodeidah and targets in Sanaa. The Houthis held back for a month after the February 2026 campaign against Iran began, then fired a missile at Israel in late March [13]. Security Council Report records no new attacks on shipping in 2026. It also records no further Houthi attacks on Israel after a US-Iran memorandum of understanding on 14 June 2026 [15]. On the Syrian front, the 1974 Disengagement Agreement kept the line quiet for decades. It created a demilitarised area of separation on the Golan Heights, patrolled by the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). Israel captured the Golan in 1967 and applied Israeli law there in 1981, a step most states do not recognise. When Assad's government fell on 8 December 2024, Israeli troops entered the area of separation and took the Syrian side of Mount Hermon. The air force also struck much of the former Syrian army's remaining weaponry. Israel said it was keeping hostile forces away from its border. Later that month the Security Council renewed UNDOF's mandate and stressed that no military forces other than UNDOF should be in the area of separation [17].

What went wrong in the intelligence failures of 1973 and 2023?

Before October 1973, Military Intelligence held what Israelis came to call "the concept": the belief that Arab states would not start a war they could not win against the IDF [11]. Egypt and Syria massed forces under cover of exercises, and Israeli analysts judged the build-up routine. On the morning of 6 October, Yom Kippur, Prime Minister Golda Meir told the US ambassador that Israel had information from "totally reliable sources" that Egypt and Syria would attack in coordination later that day. She said Israel had called up some reserves but had not declared a general mobilisation. She also said Israel would not launch a pre-emptive strike [18]. The attack began that afternoon, with most reservists still on their way to the fronts. The Agranat Commission of inquiry blamed the military leadership. Chief of Staff David Elazar and Military Intelligence chief Eli Zeira left their posts. Meir resigned soon after, although the commission did not hold her personally responsible. The 2023 failure had a similar shape. The IDF's own investigations were presented in February 2025. They found that the military had believed three things before the attack: Hamas did not want a large war, its tunnels had been badly damaged, and the border fence would stop any cross-border raid. Military Intelligence had received Hamas attack plans over several years but dismissed them as unrealistic. It also saw Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar as a pragmatist. The probes found that Hamas decided in April 2022 to attack. It was 85 % ready by September 2022, and in May 2023 it chose 7 October as the date. On the night before, the IDF noticed five signs of unusual activity but judged that they did not point to an imminent assault. Some 5,000 attackers crossed the border, and the Gaza Division was overrun for several hours without the General Staff knowing it [19]. The Times of Israel's report on the probes gives about 1,200 people killed and 251 kidnapped [19]. Human Rights Watch, as cited by the scholar Michel Wyss, counted at least 1,195 civilians and security personnel killed [11]. Wyss's study adds warnings that did not reach senior leaders. Israel had held Hamas's "Jericho Wall" invasion plan for more than a year. In July 2023 a non-commissioned officer in Unit 8200 warned that Hamas training matched the plan. On the night of 6 October, the activation of many Israeli SIM cards in Gaza was detected. Wyss concludes that the failure came from several problems at both the political and the intelligence levels, not from a single error [11]. The IDF probes did not examine decisions by the political leadership [19]. The government has not set up a state commission of inquiry. In September 2026 the High Court delayed its ruling on petitions demanding one until after the election [20].

In One Paragraph

Israel's defence rests on Ben-Gurion's pillars of deterrence, early warning and decisive victory, with defence formally added in the IDF's 2015 strategy. Because a small conscript army depends on reservists, warning is critical. It failed in October 1973 and on 7 October 2023, when about 1,200 people were killed and 251 were taken hostage after Military Intelligence dismissed Hamas's attack plans. Spending reached $46.5 billion, or 8.8 % of GDP, in 2024. IAI, Rafael and Elbit supply a layered defence of Iron Dome, David's Sling and Arrow, along with drones and cyber tools, and exports hit a record $19.2 billion in 2025. Israel uses targeted killings, which its Supreme Court allowed case by case in 2006, and a West Bank barrier that the ICJ found unlawful in 2004. It has fought Iran and its network, including Hezbollah, PIJ and the Houthis, in wars in 2024, 2025 and 2026, and has held a buffer zone in Syria since December 2024. The High Court ordered Haredi conscription in 2024, but the Knesset barred arrests of draft evaders in July 2026. Women's combat roles, first opened by the court in 1995, expanded further under a 2026 ruling.

Sources

1. Israel Defense Forces. IDF Strategy. Translated and annotated by the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Kennedy School, 2016. Introduction section.https://www.belfercenter.org/research-analysis/israel-defense-forces-strategy-document.
2. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. "Unprecedented Rise in Global Military Expenditure as European and Middle East Spending Surges." Press release, April 28, 2025. Paragraph on Israel.https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2025/unprecedented-rise-global-military-expenditure-european-and-middle-east-spending-surges.
3. Library of Congress. "Israel: High Court Rules That State Must Draft Yeshiva Students to the Military." Global Legal Monitor, July 2, 2024.https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2024-07-02/israel-high-court-rules-that-state-must-draft-yeshiva-students-to-the-military/.
4. Knesset of Israel. "Approved in Final Readings: Special Arrangement as a Temporary Provision to Suspend Arrests of Yeshiva Students Whose Torah Study Is Their Vocation." July 14, 2026.https://main.knesset.gov.il/EN/News/PressReleases/Pages/press14726w.aspx.
5. Miller v. Minister of Defence, HCJ 4541/94, 49(4) PD 94 (1995). English translation in Versa: Opinions of the Supreme Court of Israel, Cardozo School of Law. Abstract and holding.https://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/node/236.
6. Kliger v. Minister of Defense, HCJ 3227/20, April 13, 2026. Unofficial English translation, Afik & Co. Part 1 (state's figures on women in combat roles) and Part 5 (Sayeret Matkal trial and armoured formation).https://www.afiklaw.com/caselaw/20801;https://www.afiklaw.com/caselaw/20801/5.
7. Israel Ministry of Defense. "All-Time Defense Export Record: Israel Crosses the $19 Billion Threshold." Press release, June 2, 2026.https://mod.gov.il/en/press-releases/press-room/all-time-defense-export-record-israel-crosses-the-19-billion-threshold.
8. Lindsay, Jon R. "Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare." Security Studies 22, no. 3 (2013): 365–404.https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2013.816122. (Flag: paywalled; the abstract is freely accessible at this link.)
9. Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, HCJ 769/02, December 14, 2006. English translation in Versa: Opinions of the Supreme Court of Israel, Cardozo School of Law. Abstract and holding.https://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/node/309.
10. International Court of Justice. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Advisory Opinion, July 9, 2004. ICJ Reports 2004, paragraph 163.https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/131/131-20040709-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf.
11. Wyss, Michel. "The October 7 Attack: An Assessment of the Intelligence Failings." CTC Sentinel 17, no. 9 (October 2024). Sections "The Political Level" and "The Intelligence Level."https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-october-7-attack-an-assessment-of-the-intelligence-failings/.
12. Rubinstein, Reed D. "Operation Epic Fury and International Law." U.S. Department of State, Office of the Legal Adviser, April 21, 2026.https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-legal-adviser/2026/04/operation-epic-fury-and-international-law/.
13. Reuters. "Yemen's Houthis Confirm Launching Attack on Israel for First Time in Current War." March 28, 2026.https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/yemens-houthis-confirm-launching-attack-israel-first-time-current-war-2026-03-28/.
14. The White House. "Peace Through Strength: Operation Epic Fury Crushes Iranian Threat as Ceasefire Takes Hold." April 8, 2026.https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/04/peace-through-strength-operation-epic-fury-crushes-iranian-threat-as-ceasefire-takes-hold/.
15. Security Council Report. "The Red Sea." Monthly Forecast, July 2026.https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2026-07/the-red-sea.php.
16. United Nations Security Council. Resolution 2722 (2024). S/RES/2722, January 10, 2024.https://docs.un.org/en/S/RES/2722(2024).
17. United Nations. "Security Council Extends Mandate of United Nations Observer Force in Golan for Six Months through Resolution 2766 (2024) amid Reports of Israel Incursion." Meetings Coverage SC/15951, 9826th Meeting, December 20, 2024.https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15951.doc.htm. See also United Nations Disengagement Observer Force. "UNDOF Press Statement." December 13, 2024.https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/news/undof-press-statement.
18. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976. Vol. 25, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, document 99, "Memorandum From William B. Quandt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)," October 6, 1973.https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25/d99.
19. Fabian, Emanuel. "IDF's Oct. 7 Probes Show It Misread Hamas for Years, Left Southern Israel Utterly Vulnerable." Times of Israel, February 27, 2025.https://www.timesofisrael.com/idfs-oct-7-probes-show-it-misread-hamas-for-years-left-southern-israel-utterly-vulnerable/.
20. Sharon, Jeremy. "High Court Delays Decision on October 7 State Commission until after Election." Times of Israel, September 2026.https://www.timesofisrael.com/high-court-delays-decision-on-october-7-state-commission-until-after-election/.